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Abstract 
After the global financial crisis, India was exposed to many external shocks from commodity 
prices and foreign capital flows. Although capital flow fluctuations were largely due to global 
risk-on risk-off factors, a widening current account deficit (CAD) contributed to India’s 
vulnerability to external shocks. The major source of shocks was external, but policy 
mistakes increased India’s vulnerability. These included inadequate attention to sectoral 
bottlenecks that reduced export growth and domestic financial savings, while substitution 
away from expensive oil imports was discouraged. Dependence on foreign capital, to finance 
the CAD, rose while degrees of freedom from continuing capital controls were underutilized 
to reduce exchange rate volatility and to smooth interest rates. Steep depreciations combined 
with volatility did not help exporters. Evaluation of measures to stabilize the exchange rate 
establishes that temporarily taking oil marketing companies demand out of the market was 
the most effective, since small demand-supply mismatches lead to large currency movements 
in thin markets. Prudential measures such as increasing position limits, margin requirements 
are to be preferred to a ban on a market or a transaction-type. If market restrictions become 
necessary, they should be carefully targeted. Accumulation and use of reserves, use of market 
information and of signalling can all help implement managed floating. Such an exchange 
rate regime can contribute to effective inflation targeting without the policy rate rising to 
reduce depreciation as in the classic interest rate defense.  
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1. Introduction 
India experienced many external shocks from commodity prices and foreign capital flows in 
the post global financial crisis (GFC) period. Inelastic oil imports and inflation-driven 
demand for gold contributed to a widening of the current account deficit (CAD), and its 
financing became an issue. But fluctuations in capital flows largely follow global risk factors 
unrelated to domestic needs. Just talk of quantitative easing (QE) withdrawal (known as the 
taper on) lead to steep depreciation and loss of emerging market (EM) asset values in May 
2013. March 2014 saw a reversal of sentiment with 30 EMs receiving USD 39 billion 
compared to only 5 billion in January, according to the Institute for International Finance. But 
a surge normally ends in a sudden stop. The worst case for India is if oil shocks and global 
risk-off, or rising risk aversion, occur together. This happened in late 2011 with the Euro debt 
crisis.  
 
While advanced economies (AEs) recognize the collateral damage to EMs they tend to 
dismiss it saying EMs gained from inflows in the past, and will gain from AE revival; there is 
probably a bubble in EM assets that needs to burst. But if there is a bubble then how did EMs 
gain from QE induced inflows in the first place? QE hurt EMs by firming commodity prices 
and widening CADs. Easier inflow based finance allowed neglect of structural reforms, while 
encouraging over-stimulus. Inflows also first-over-appreciated EM currencies, then led to 
sharp depreciations. The Brazilian finance minister coined the term ‘currency wars’ for these 
gyrations. This chapter explores how India negotiated these global gales
1
. 
 
The major source of shocks was external, but policy mistakes increased India’s vulnerability. 
These included inadequate attention to removing domestic bottlenecks that reduced export 
growth, and domestic financial savings, while expensive oil imports rose. Dependence on 
foreign capital, to finance the CAD, was allowed to rise while degrees of freedom from 
continuing capital controls were underutilized to reduce exchange rate volatility and to 
smooth interest rates. High exchange rate volatility and steep depreciations did not help 
exporters or industry.     
 
The chapter examines aspects of openness, and shows despite twin deficits there was no 
generalized excess demand. Sectoral bottlenecks, oil shocks, and capital outflow associated 
                                                          
1
The paper draws on and updates Goyal (2013b, 2011) and articles in Hindu Business Line over 2013, such as 
(Goyal 2013a) available at http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/ashima-goyal/ 
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sharp depreciations widened the CAD.  Evaluation of measures to stabilize the exchange rate 
establishes that temporarily taking oil marketing companies demand out of the market was 
the most effective, since small demand-supply mismatches lead to large currency movements 
in thin markets. The experience suggests managed floating can be achieved through measures 
such as accumulation and use of reserves, use of market information and of signaling. Such 
an exchange rate regime can contribute to effective inflation targeting without the policy rate 
rising to reduce depreciation as in the classic interest rate defense.  
 
Various market restrictive measures reduced market turnover sharply in the currency 
derivatives markets in exchanges, while total turnover including the dominant over-the-
counter trading in banks also fell. This suggests the two types of markets are complements 
rather than substitutes. Offshore markets grew at the expense of domestic markets. Therefore 
prudential measures such as increasing position limits, margin requirements are to be 
preferred to a ban on a market or a transaction-type. If market restrictions become necessary, 
they should be carefully targeted. Since administrative measures can reduce one-way 
positions, a general liquidity squeeze such as an interest rate defense, should be avoided. 
When the latter was attempted in mid-2013, an inadequate rise in short-term rates raised 
already high interest rate spreads and long-term rates, hurting the domestic recovery and 
domestic financial markets. 
 
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: after section 2 sets out the degree of 
openness and analyzes the effects of shocks, section 3 examines determinants of the CAD. 
Section 4 brings out the policy failures that compounded external shocks. Section 5 draws out 
lessons on what measures proved to be most effective in reducing the impact of external 
shocks on the exchange rate, and their effect on foreign exchange (FX) markets. This leads 
on to the discussion of the exchange rate regime in the context of inflation targeting in section 
6, before section 7 gives some pointers for the way forward for domestic and international 
policies. 
 
2. The degree of openness 
The balance of payments (BoP) gives a snapshot of transactions with the rest of the world. It 
shows how as India opened out and grew faster, the absolute size of these Indian transactions 
and their ratios to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) rose (Table 1).  
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Figure 1: India's balance of payments (ratio to GDP) 
 
Table 1: Major items of India’s balance of payments (USD billion) 
  2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 
  Q1(PR) Q2 (PR) Q3 (PR) Q4 (PR) Q1(PR) Q2 (PR) Q3 (PR) Q4 (PR) Q1 (P) 
Trade Balance -9.7 -9.8 -10.6 -10.5 -10.2 -11.4 -12 -9 -11.3 
Net Services 3.6 3.1 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.9 3.4 3.3 3.8 
Net Income 2.4 2.6 2.7 2.5 2.8 2.5 2 2.1 2.6 
Current Account Deficit -3.8 -4.2 -4.3 -4.4 -4 -5 -6.5 -3.6 -4.9 
Capital and Financial 
Account, Net (Excl. 
changes in reserves) 
5.2 4.3 1.7 3.3 3.8 4.9 6.5 4 4.6 
Note: Total of subcomponents may not tally with aggregate due to rounding off.  PR: Partially Revised. P: Preliminary. 
Source: RBI Macroeconomic and Monetary Developments various years 
 
Figure 1 shows there was a CAD in most years. Since this is exports minus imports of goods 
and services, it takes a negative value. It was however relatively stable in the post reform 
period, varying between -3 and +2.3 as a ratio of GDP, until after the GFC when it first fell 
below -3, which is widely regarded as the sustainable level. It even reached -6.5 percent in 
Q3 2012-13 (Table 1). The deficit was much larger on the trade account, but was partially 
compensated by a surplus on invisible items such as net services. 
 
A deficit requires foreign capital to finance it. This was not a problem in the pre GFC years 
as capital inflows rose sharply and the deficit was moderate. The capital account peaked at 
9.2 as a ratio of GDP in 2007-08, although there were fluctuations. Figure 1, which graphs 
components of the BOP as a percentage of GDP, shows the change in reserves to be a mirror 
image of the capital account—peak capital flows were largely absorbed in reserves, since 
they much exceeded the CAD.  
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After a sharp drop as Lehman Brothers fell in October 2008, inflows resumed. But now they 
were barely sufficient to finance the widening CAD. Drawdown of reserves was limited so 
there were large fluctuations in the rupee. Even so, Figure 1 shows reserves did fall in the 
GFC year 2008-09. Foreign currency accumulation soon restarted but increments in reserves 
were small since inflows now about equaled the CAD. Table 1 shows this for Q1 and Q2 
2011-12. But in Q3, as the Euro debt crisis escalated, inflows fell far short of a widening 
CAD. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) sold some reserves, but the rupee slumped to 55
2
. 
Inflows revived somewhat in Q4 (Table 1) and the rupee, came back towards 50. But the 
CAD was not necessarily responsible for the depreciation of the INR. There were periods 
when deterioration did not provoke an outflow and depreciation (Figure 2). The causality 
could be the reverse, with sharp depreciation due to risk-off capital outflows widening the 
CAD by increasing the import bill. 
 
Although the capital plus the current account must equal the change in reserves, a tautology 
does not imply causality.  Many macro variables adjust to achieve the equality. It is 
sometimes said that higher capital inflows lead to higher CADs. This is possible over the 
longer-term if capital inflows result in real exchange rate over-valuation, but this was 
generally avoided in India. It was during periods of outflows that the CAD widened. Inflows 
do provide a tempting short-term financing option, but they are fickle, a fact policy was 
generally aware of. 
 
 
Figure 2: Quarterly CAD and exchange rate movements 
 
                                                          
2
 For the year as a whole the CAD was 4.2% compared to capital inflows at 3.7%. The RBI’s draw-down of 
reserves, amounting to 12.8 billion USD, made up the difference. In 2012-13 the CAD peaked at 4.8%, before 
coming down the next year.   
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But could domestic policy have taken measures to prevent the unprecedented widening of the 
CAD? 
 
3. CAD: Excess demand or external and sectoral shocks? 
That there were twin deficits, a fiscal deficit (FD) as well as a CAD, suggests there was 
generalized excess demand that policy could have reduced. However, even as the CAD 
widened in 2011-12, India’s GDP growth rate fell to 6.5 percent, compared to 8.4 percent in 
the previous year. Further widening of the CAD in the next year accompanied even lower 
growth of 5 percent. Growth in aggregate demand categories like consumption and fixed 
investment also fell. As against this, the CAD was only 1.3 percent in 2007-08, a year of high 
consumption and investment when output grew at above 9 per cent. So it was supply shocks, 
not excess demand that widened the CAD. Commodity price shocks led inflation raised 
imports of crude oil and gold, and reduced financial savings.  
 
 
Figure 3: Current account deficit and trade deficit (X-M) adjusted for oil (O) and gold (G) (ratio to 
GDP) 
 
A steep rise in commodity prices occurred despite a global slowdown, because of QE and 
risks in the Middle-East. Oil price shocks raised the rupee import bill, even as incomplete 
pass through to domestic oil prices further lowered the already low substitution elasticity for 
oil products. Periodic rupee depreciation raised the rupee value of imports.  Thus rising CAD 
levels could be linked to multiple cost shocks that began with the spiralling of global food 
and oil prices in 2008. Their slow release through the system, given dysfunctional 
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administered price regimes, kept inflation high even as growth fell. Figure 3 shows 
subtracting imports of oil and gold from the trade deficit makes it a trade surplus
3
. 
 
The CAD must equal I-S by definition. Investment falls in slowdowns, but if savings fall 
even more, the CAD widens. Financial savings finance investment that requires traded goods 
imports, while physical savings, such as in real estate, are invested more in non-traded goods. 
So a fall in financial savings widens the trade and current account deficits more. Financial 
disintermediation due to the absence of inflation hedges raises the demand for gold. This 
reduces financial savings as well as directly increases imports. Savings also fall as incomes 
fall (especially firm profits and government revenues). 
 
In 2011-12 the CAD rose to 4.2 per cent of GDP, from 2.7 per cent the previous year – i.e. by 
1.5 percentage points. Investment fell from 36.8 to 35 percent, or by 1.8 percentage points, 
while savings fell more from 34 to 30.8 or by 3.2. The largest fall in a savings component 
was in household financial savings from 10.4 to 8 per cent, or by 2.4 percentage points. This, 
together with fall in corporate saving of 0.7, itself almost entirely covers the rise in CAD and 
fall in investment. Household physical savings actually increased by 1.2 almost covering the 
fall in public sector saving of 1.3; both largely affect the demand for non-traded goods 
(Goyal, 2013a). There was public sector dissaving due to post GFC fiscal stimulus and rising 
oil subsidies, but the fall in household financial savings was the largest component. 
 
The FD widened due to the coordinated global stimulus pushed by the G-20. The fiscal 
stimulus was kept in place too long because of the uncertain global recovery. As the 
Government, concerned about rating downgrades, made a serious effort to reduce the FD in 
the last quarter of 2012, growth in government consumption fell to 1.9 per cent, from 8 per 
cent in the preceding quarter, while that for community, social and personal services as a 
whole fell from 7.5 to 5.4 per cent. That the fall in the FD reduced growth in services but not 
the CAD provides evidence government expenditure creates demand largely for non-tradable 
goods, and for a varied food basket. Excess demand may be a problem only in agriculture, 
where supply rigidities prevent expansion to keep up with demand for food variety (Goyal, 
2013b), while a depreciating INR prevented imports from offering a low cost solution.  
 
                                                          
3
 But if petroleum product exports are subtracted from exports a trade deficit of about 2 per cent appears. All of 
India’s oil imports were not for domestic consumption since a large refining industry had developed. 
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Analysis of cycles also supports the sectoral and external shocks explanation for the widening 
of the CAD. The trade surplus (net exports, NX) is procyclical in India rather than 
countercyclical as it would be if it was driven by domestic demand. Correlation of NX 
normalized by output and output (NX/Y with Y) is positive. NX/Y tends to fall in periods of 
low growth, associated with low external demand, rather than falling when rising growth and 
domestic demand raise imports (Goyal, 2011). 
 
Such an inverse relationship between the CAD and growth can occur if as exports rise they 
raise growth and NX. On the other hand, a sudden collapse of export markets, due to a global 
shock, reduces growth and decreases NX. If oil shocks raise costs, and set in a contraction, 
NX would again fall along with falling growth as imports rise. The period after the financial 
crisis saw both a collapse in export markets and a rapid resumption in oil price hikes. These 
external shocks drove the trade deficit. 
 
The post GFC experience lends itself to the following causal inferences:  
1. External shocks were largely responsible for the widening of the CAD. These 
included fall in world export demand, and rise in oil prices given inelastic import 
demand. The latter, together with sectoral bottlenecks, raised domestic inflation and 
reduced domestic financial savings. Sharp depreciations due to risk-off outflows
4
, 
further raised the import bill and the CAD.   
2. Although India required a higher level of inflows to finance a widening CAD, it was 
the fall in inflows, not the CAD that was primarily responsible for rupee depreciation. 
When inflows were plentiful, CADs were financed without depreciation. 
3. But there was a vicious cycle since countries with higher CADs tended to experience 
more outflows during risk-off periods, which led to depreciation that worsened the 
CAD. 
 
4. Policy failures 
Even if external and sectoral shocks, rather than excess demand, were largely responsible for 
the widening CAD, there was aggravation from policy mistakes. The government did not act 
to alleviate sectoral bottlenecks, instead squeezing aggregate demand. It also allowed too 
much exchange rate and interest rate volatility. 
                                                          
4
 Periods when there were outflows from most EMs back to AE safe havens included the European debt crisis of 
2011, the US taper on announcement in May 2013, and problems in Argentina and Turkey in January 2014. 
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Domestic supply bottlenecks raised coal imports, just as faltering world demand reduced 
general export demand. The administered pricing regime reduced substitution away from 
expensive imports. A paucity of inflation protected savings instruments reduced financial 
savings and increased the demand for gold imports. Absence of action, on constraints in 
agricultural marketing, boosted food inflation. 
 
Although crude oil dominates the import basket, a structural rise in imports does occur with 
higher growth. Ultimately, exports have to rise to finance these. Policy that relies on 
depreciation to stimulate exports, without building export capacity and lowering costs is 
inadequate.  For example, India’s per container trade costs are more than twice the East Asia 
average. Bureaucratic delays and hurdles prevent it becoming part of Asian export supply 
chains. 
 
The short-term imperative of financing the CAD, led to excessive policy focus on increasing 
these inflows, in a departure from earlier caution. But inflows carry the risk of reversals 
which contributed to the external shocks India faced. Inflows also build-up debt that has to be 
eventually repaid by running a current account surplus. They induce excessive exchange and 
interest rate movements that hurt aggregate demand. The larger debt flows allowed 
conservative voices pushing for the interest rate defence of the exchange rate to win the 
argument, although such a defence continued to be inappropriate in Indian conditions. 
Leaving the rupee wholly to markets over 2009-11 was another major policy mistake. Later 
experience showed many types of action were possible.  
 
Absence of adequate steps to reverse the exit of domestic households from capital markets, 
led to FPI driven volatility dominating domestic markets. Volatility could have been reduced 
if the domestic retail debt had first been developed, offering more instruments suiting 
household needs. This would also have raised the share of household financial savings. 
Market participation of domestic pension funds could also have been liberalized. 
 
4.1 Composition and consequences of capital flows 
Indian reform liberalized portfolio investment by foreign institutional investors (FIIs) more, 
in line with its vision of developing domestic markets, even while retaining graduated 
10 
 
restrictions on debt, especially short-term debt, inflows
5
. The rationale was that even though 
equity flows are volatile they are at least risk sharing, while debt outflows impose a greater 
burden in downturns. China kept restrictions on all types of capital flows while liberalizing 
direct investment. India chose a different combination since it had more domestic industry to 
protect. Short-term debt is riskier since it is difficult and expensive to roll it over at crises 
times, as asset values fall and the currency depreciates. Moreover, higher growth attracts 
equity flows, and lower interest rates encourage growth. But debt flows come into 
government or corporate debt funds to earn an interest differential, so outflows affect 
domestic interest rates in addition to the exchange rate. Policy has to raise interest rates to 
retain debt flows, thus hurting growth, as well as equity flows. The inflationary impact of 
depreciation and rising risk premiums can stall a policy rate cutting cycle. Depreciation also 
reduces returns on FPI. 
 
Figure 4 shows the fluctuations in foreign portfolio investment (FPI), that came in through 
foreign institution investors (FIIs) or their sub-accounts registered with the regulator, and the 
steadier increase in foreign direct investment (FDI). Fluctuations in non-resident Indian 
deposits reflect interest rate arbitrage limited by shifting policy caps on interest rates. 
 
 
Figure 4: Capital inflows to India (ratio to GDP) 
 
Restrictions were tightened when there was a surge in aggregate capital inflows, and relaxed 
when inflows slowed. Controls on outflows by residents were relaxed only very gradually, 
                                                          
5
 In 2011, for example, an FII could invest up to 10% of the total issued capital of an Indian company. The cap 
on aggregate debt flows from all FIIs together was 1.55 billion USD. This was increased to 30 billion to 
facilitate financing of the CAD. A given percentage of GDP implies very different absolute levels of inflows by 
the end of a period of rapid GDP growth –the absorptive capacity of the economy also rises. Inflows could only 
come through FIIs- individuals could not invest directly. 
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initially only for current account transactions. Globally, the most volatile cross border flows 
around the period of the GFC were inter-bank flows—India’s conservative bank open 
position limits and restrictions on intermediary flows protected it from excess volatility on 
this count. Equity inflows dominated because of caps on debt inflows. These must continue 
until fundamentals improve and domestic markets deepen. 
 
 
Figure 5: Monthly equity and debt inflows (USD million) 
 
Post 2011 imperatives of financing the CAD did lead to unwarranted relaxations in debt 
flows. By 2013 caps on government debt for foreign investors had been raised to USD 30 
billion (overall debt limit including corporate bonds at 81 billion). Expansion of external 
commercial borrowings (ECBs), to facilitate domestic firms borrowing abroad, meant 
domestic firms were carrying more and more currency risk. Figure 5 shows outflows after 
Bernanke’s May 2013 statement were largely in the debt component. Outflows occurred 
because of an expected strengthening of US bond yields, on earlier withdrawing of QE. 
Indian market positions were largely long in government debt as interest rates were in a 
downward phase. But yields rose with the policy response to debt outflows that raised short 
rates by 300 basis points. There were large domestic market losses as bond values fell.  
 
But even in September 2013, after relaxation in debt caps, the share of debt securities was 
still small at 36 per cent of equity securities and 6 per cent of total liabilities. So the rise in 
yields was driven more by unnecessary policy tightening, not the debt outflows, in the Indian 
context
6
. Policy did not utilize degrees of freedom from the careful sequencing of capital 
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 Debt outflows over May 22-August 26
th
 were 868 USD million for Indonesia, where foreign funding of 
domestic currency sovereign bonds had been liberalized considerably, compared to 35 USD million for India. 
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account convertibility. Research at the IMF (2014) showing bond mutual funds, especially 
retail funds, are twice as sensitive as equity mutual funds to global sentiment, underlines the 
wisdom of the sequencing
7
.  
 
 
Figure 6: India’s income payments abroad (-) (ratio to GDP) 
 
Table 2: Overall international investment position of India (USD billion) 
  2009-Sep 2010-Sep 2011-Sep 2012-Sep 
2013-Sep 
(PR) 
Assets   375.9 406.9 434.7 441.9 436.7 
of which  
    Direct Investment    76.5 91.5 109.1 115.9 120.1 
    Reserve Assets 281.3 292.9 311.5 294.8 277.2 
Liabilities  482.5 611.9 659.6 713.4 736.2 
of which  
   Direct Investment 159.3 197.8 212.9 229.9 218.1 
   Portfolio Investment 106 163.8 161.5 164.6 171.6 
   Equity Securities 85.1 130.5 128 125.7 124.3 
   Debt Securities 20.9 33.3 33.5 39 47.3 
   Other Investment 217.1 250.4 285.2 318.9 346.5 
   Trade Credits 41.9 56.6 66.7 76.9 89.6 
   Loans 120.7 134.8 158 164.8 168.7 
   Currency & Deposits 46.7 50.5 52.4 67.2 75.2 
   Other Liabilities 7.9 8.5 8.1 10 13.1 
Source: Macroeconomic and Monetary Developments, table III.2 Major items of India’s balance of payments 
www.rbi.org.in 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
So Indonesia had to raise policy rates 175 basis posts post taper-on. IMF (2013) in a regression of domestic on 
US yields finds a significant coefficient (1.1) for Indonesia compared to insignificant (-0.3) for India.    
7
 In a sensible application of this logic, the RBI in 2014 disallowed FPI investments in G-Secs of less than one 
year maturity, in anticipation of possible future taper-related volatility. 
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Overtime capital flows affect international debt or, as it is known in India, the country’s 
International Investment Position (Table 2). India’s strategic choices in capital account 
convertibility imply liabilities comprise mostly FDI and foreigner’s equity holdings. Assets 
largely reflect the rise in foreign exchange (FX) reserves, and some outward FDI. The 
reserves are sufficient to cover short term outflows particularly since equity outflows would 
reduce in value during a concerted exit. Even so, the short-term debt component has risen 
above 40 percent, in residual maturity terms, which is unhealthy. The rising debt and share of 
FIs played a role in convincing authorities that markets were too large and reserves too small 
for the RBI to intervene. But this was an incorrect conclusion since reserves were still large 
compared to volatile components such as foreign liabilities, debt and equity securities (Table 
2). Indian reserves satisfied various criteria of reserve adequacy used such as comparing them 
to the sum of short-term external debt plus CAD, or CAD minus FDI inflows. Indeed the IMF 
regarded Indian reserves as too large 
 
As a country continues to borrow more abroad than it lends, it has to service the debt. So its 
gross national product (GNP) is less than its GDP. Net income paid abroad has to be 
deducted from GDP produced within a nation’s boundary to obtain the nation’s GNP. Figure 
6 shows the adjustment as a ratio to GDP. Although the adjustment is negative, the amount is 
low, only about minus half a percentage point. Despite rising debt, the ratio stayed constant in 
recent years because a rise in GDP and fall in global interest rates reduced net interest and 
service payments. These can, however, rise rapidly as global interest rates rise. So borrowing 
must be used productively.  
 
5. Reducing the impact of external shocks on the exchange rate 
Risk premiums are volatile in thin EM markets. Capital flows that respond to global not to 
domestic conditions, also aggravate the tendency for exchange rates to overshoot 
fundamental values, so the value of the currency cannot be left to markets alone. The 
academic literature also has shifted away from advocating corner regimes of a full float or 
tight fix for EMs towards middling regimes (Corden, 2002). China did manage successful 
catch-up growth with a fixed nominal exchange rate. But India chose to develop markets 
earlier because of its advantage in financial services, so it has to allow a more flexible market 
determined exchange rate. The float, however, has to be managed. 
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Unfortunately, just as strong global risk-on risk-off in the period after the GFC created 
perverse movements in the exchange rate, policy became increasingly hands off. Although 
the stated position remained the RBI would act to prevent excess volatility, markets were 
allowed to determine INR level and volatility subject to what remained of capital controls 
that were being reduced under domestic and international pressure. Intervention was 
temporarily suspended in 2007 at a time of strong inflows that made sterilization difficult, but 
resumed to accumulate inflows from October as the market stabilization bonds were 
negotiated for cost sharing with the government. The INR had to depreciate during post-
Lehman equity outflows in order for them to take a write-down in asset values and share risk. 
The RBI did sell some reserves. Inflows resumed quickly, however, and upto end 2011, were 
just adequate to finance the CAD (Figure 1). So there was hardly any intervention in this 
period. This led to the market misperception that the RBI was unable to intervene in FX 
markets, aided by statements from the RBI about the large size of India’s FX liabilities and 
potential capital movements relative to reserves. As a result the rupee went into a free fall in 
end 2011. An environment of low growth and a rising CAD added to the fragility of FX 
markets. 
 
There is an argument that hands off during depreciations contributes to an undervalued real 
exchange rate that helps exports. But a fall in export growth and a widening CAD 
accompanied depreciation from INR/USD 45 in early 2011 to 67 in September 2013, when 
depreciation is supposed to improve both CAD and exports (see the qualifications to this 
argument in Box 1). In October 2013 the INR recovered to 62, but exports began to grow as 
global growth revived. High volatility, such as a sharp depreciation, does not help exporters. 
 
Depreciation corrects for inflation differentials but itself contributes to inflation, as imports 
and import substitutes become costly, so real depreciation is much lower. Instead a vicious 
cycle of higher inflation requiring more depreciation sets in. Repeated bouts of sharp 
depreciation contributed to sticky Indian inflation, and hardened inflation expectations. Post 
the 2011 depreciation, growth fell while inflation remained high and sticky.  
 
Moreover, the depreciation over-corrected for inflation, since the real effective exchange rate 
also depreciated sharply. By end December 2013, the 6-currency and 36-currency REER had 
depreciated to 10.5 and 8.2 per cent respectively over March 2013, coming after a respective 
5.9 and 6.7 per cent depreciation in the previous fiscal year. The indices (base 2004-05 = 
15 
 
100) stood at 95 and 87.3 in end December (RBI 2014). Prior to this, over 2010-11 and 2011-
12 there was mild real appreciation—the 36-country REER rose to 103.9 and 101.4 
respectively. But export growth was 21.8% in 2011-12 and collapsed to -1.8 the next year 
with the slowdown in Europe. The brief appreciation cannot be blamed for the export 
slowdown and CAD widening. It was global demand effects that dominated. 
 
BOX 1: Re-switching: Does depreciation reduce a CAD?  
The real exchange rate affects exports and imports depending on the elasticity of demand. 
The Marshall-Lerner condition says that depreciation will improve a CAD only if the sum of 
import and export elasticity of demand exceeds unity in absolute terms. There is also 
evidence of immediate worsening of the CAD with improvement after a lag. This J-curve 
occurs if price contracts take time to be re-negotiated. Since for an EM imports are often 
priced in dollars and exports in domestic currency, the initial impact of depreciation only 
raises the import bill. The CAD deteriorates. If exporters have less market power, they may 
not be able to get the higher domestic currency prices required to stimulate exports, even in 
the long-run.  
 
If the pass through from depreciation to domestic prices is high, inflation appreciates the real 
exchange rate and real depreciation is limited. The pass through tends to be higher for 
commodities such as oil, which are contracted in dollar prices, and for differentiated goods 
imports such as high quality capital goods for which competition is limited. These dominate 
the Indian import basket. It is also higher in times of high inflation, for large spikes and 
persistent changes in the exchange rate since menu costs of price change are then exceeded 
(Ghosh and Rajan, 2007). Mallick and Marques (2008) also find the pass through to import 
prices to be high in India. 
 
The global cycle also matters. In a period of low global demand depreciation cannot increase 
exports, so only adds to import costs. In the UK also the pound depreciated 20 per cent since 
2007 but their CAD worsened from 2.3 percent of GDP then to 3.7 in 2013, since demand for 
financial services, one of their chief exports, fell. Inflation rates were above their 2 percent 
target in all this period, peaking at above 5 percent in 2011, partly due to the currency 
depreciation. 
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But in the UK policy interest rates were kept low and this, together with a floating exchange 
rate, allowed the government to borrow at much lower rates than most countries under the 
Euro. For example, the UK ten year bond yield was only 2.5 percent in 2013. In AEs with 
free floats and capital flows interest parity forces instant over depreciation, the expected 
future appreciation allows domestic interest rates to be below foreign rates while equating the 
returns to capital. EMs do not have this facility, since sustained depreciation tends to raise 
country risk. For EM currencies it tends to lead not to expected appreciation back towards 
fundamentals but to fears of further weakening. So taking a sharp INR depreciation need not 
even facilitate lower interest rates. 
 
Over the longer-term, an undervalued real exchange rate does increase exports, as the 
Chinese experience demonstrates. But to be sustained it requires a disciplined labour market, 
where real wages do not rise. Chinese wages rose after many years of high growth, but Indian 
wages began to rise much earlier in the Indian catch-up cycle. The rise in Indian real wages 
over 2007-13 years requires real appreciation, which has to occur through inflation if there is 
nominal depreciation. And indeed, as wages continued to rise, inflation intensified after a 
sharp 2011 depreciation reversed earlier real appreciation. In Indian conditions a steady 
competitive REER, may be feasible, but undervaluation is difficult to sustain.  Such a REER 
may be adequate to maintain healthy export growth, with complementary supply side 
measures. 
…. 
 
The RBI did begin to sell reserves in November 2011 as the INR spiralled downwards. It also 
restricted FX markets. Retrospective taxation in budget 2012, and the Fed’s taper 
announcement in May 2013, all led to outflows requiring RBI action
8
. Some of many feasible 
policy actions, including administrative measures such as controls, market restrictions, 
intervention or buying and selling in FX markets, signalling, and monetary policy measures 
such as the classic interest rate defense were used.  
 
Table 3, which lists the policy measures taken over 2010-2013, attempts to assess their 
effectiveness by estimating the impact on the exchange rate,  that is, did a measure reverse or 
                                                          
8
 After zero intervention from January, monthly net purchases in USD million were 10678 over 2007:10 to 
2008:10. This switched to net sales of 1505 over 2008:11 to 2009:4 as outflows intensified under the GFC. 
Average intervention was near zero at monthly net purchases of 285 over 2009:05 to 2011:10. But 2011:10 to 
2013:07 saw heavy monthly net sales of 8580.   
17 
 
add to existing market movements? The Table gives the basis points change in the INR/USD 
rate in the week before and the week after a measure. A negative entry implies an 
appreciation of the INR and a positive entry the reverse.  
Table 3 
Date Change in 
INR/USD    
(week before) 
Change in 
INR/USD    
(week after) 
Policy action 
28 December 
2010 
-0.21 0.03 RBI issues guidelines for OTC FX 
derivatives and overseas hedging  
1 Feb. 2011 0.11  -0.48  Derivatives guidelines applied 
15 September 
2011 
1.82 1.83 Exchange earners foreign currency  
account and residents foreign 
currency accounts- liberalisation 
15 November 
2011 
1.19 1.54 Increase in ceiling rate on banks’ 
export credit in foreign currency by 
150 basis points 
5 December 
2011 
-0.77 2.18 Speech reinforcing RBI’s hands-off 
policy 
15 December 
2011 
2.79 -1.51 Bank net open position limits 
(NOPL) reduced 75%; Free 
cancellation and rebooking of FX 
forward contracts disallowed 
21 May 2012 1.04 0.90 Netting of positions in currency 
futures/ options with OTC positions 
disallowed; position limits of banks 
for currency futures and options 
reduced 
11 Sept. 2012 0.07 -1.18 ECB policy eased 
13 May 2013 0.96 0.12 RBI restricts banks’ gold imports 
22 May 2013 0.89 0.58 Bernanke says Fed may taper QE 
20 June 2013 1.43 -0.001 Foreign banks open positions in 
USD/INR reduced to almost zero 
9 July 2013 0.93 -0.71 Any proprietary activity by banks in 
currency futures banned 
10 July 2013 0.72 -0.42 Public sector oil companies directed 
to buy FX only from one bank (SBI) 
23 July 2013 -0.36 1.43 Monetary tightening measures 
started from July 9; reduced LAF 
limit to 0.5% of a bank’s own 
NDTL; banks to maintain a daily 
minimum CRR balance of 99%; 
MSF rate raised to 10.25 and CMR 
moved up to it from repo of 7.25.  
28 August 2013 4.63 -2.32 FX swap window for oil companies 
(closed end-November) 
4 September 
2013 
1.36 -3.24 Window for the banks 
to swap the fresh 
FCNR(B) deposits 
with RBI and increase 
in Banks' overseas 
borrowing limit with 
option of swap with 
RBI 
18 September 
2013 
-1.07 -0.92 Fed refrains from QE taper, keeps 
bond buying at USD85 Bn 
11 November 
2013 
1.89 -0.74 Participation by SEBI registered 
FIIs, QFIs long term investors in 
credit enhanced bonds 
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The Table indicates the most effective measure was the FX swap window announced for oil 
marketing companies in end August 2013. Not only did the INR strengthen substantially, but 
it reversed an existing depreciation. The rupee continued to gain after that, as other measures 
were added to the swap window that remained open till end November. Measures that made 
more FX available, such as the swap window and subsidy for banks foreign borrowing or 
easier ECB also appreciated the INR; restrictions on markets such as reducing position limits 
worked only sometimes. The use of the interest rate defense in July 2013 was a total failure. 
Signals that the RBI was unable to intervene and the INR should be left to the markets had a 
large impact but were also counter-productive. Well-designed signals could, therefore, have 
the desired effect. Global shocks such as Fed announcements also impacted the INR.  
 
The lessons from this experience are the importance of designing policy in line with the 
current state of capital account convertibility and evolution of markets. Given India’s growth 
prospects and relatively greater reliance on growth driven equity flows, the interest rate 
defense is counter-productive at the current juncture and should be avoided, even as restraints 
continue on debt flows. Equity investors’ assets loose value with a sharp depreciation, but an 
ineffective interest rate defense does not help existing equity investors, even as reduced 
growth harms new entrants. 
 
Under adverse expectation driven outflows the market demand and supply for FX will not 
determine an exchange rate based on fundamentals. Smoothing lumpy foreign currency 
demand in a thin and fragile FX market is important. Direct provision of FX to oil marketing 
companies was first used in the mid-nineties
9
. It is a useful way to provide FX reserves to a 
fragile market without supporting departing capital flows. It showed there are innovative 
ways of using reserves, which can be built up again during periods of excessive inflows. 
Although swaps add exchange rate risk to the RBI’s balance sheet, it need not materialize 
over the short life of the swap if markets are successfully calmed. They also encourage 
domestic entities to hedge. It is only if these polices are not used effectively that restricting 
markets may become necessary
10
. But that should be avoided, to the extent possible, since it 
                                                          
9
 I thank Dr. Y.V. Reddy for this point. 
10
Thus in December 2011, the INR remained under pressure despite a reduction in global risk-on due to ECB 
announcement of support to bank lending and money market activity (see 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2011/html/pr111208_1.en.html) due to the RBI’s then hands-off policy 
and reluctance to use reserves, thus necessitating severe market restrictions on December 15
th
. These brought the 
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has adverse side-effects. Actions appropriate to the Indian context and reform path, were the 
most effective.  Following such a restraint also reduces regulatory discretion that in a 
complex environment can lead to over- or under kill. 
 
5.1 Domestic markets 
The repeated scams and financial mishaps of the nineties demonstrated the fragility of a 
controlled system. Therefore financial reforms towards steady market deepening were 
undertaken. But the global financial crisis demonstrated the wisdom of India’s slow and 
steady approach to market development, and the necessity of prudential regulation to reduce 
risk-taking. Action on the INR should be consistent with these lessons, while not reversing 
cautious steps forward to further deepen domestic markets.  
 
 
Figure 7: FX market turnover (USD billion) 
 
Figure 7 shows various market restrictive measures reduced market turnover sharply in the 
currency derivatives markets in exchanges, while total turnover including the dominant over-
the-counter (OTC) FX trading in banks also fell. This suggests the two types of markets are 
complements rather than substitutes. Exchanges are thought to be dominated by speculative 
position-taking since no real underlying is required unlike in the RBI regulated OTC markets. 
But in FX markets worldwide portfolio rebalancing types of transactions between market 
makers are normally much larger than those based on real exposures. These allow banks, as 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
INR back from 55 to 50. Adverse tax measures for MNCs in the March 2012 budget triggered outflows and the 
INR again reached 55, leading to further market restrictions in May 2012. 
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well as small firms that may not get a good deal at banks, to lay-off risks in futures markets. 
But expectations are especially important in such markets and can lead to one-way positions.  
 
Under freer capital flows, restricting domestic markets encourages transactions to migrate 
abroad. Although difficult to measure precisely, the non-deliverable forward (NDF) market 
may be above 50 per cent of the onshore market
11
 and rose in the period of market 
restrictions. This is against the objective of developing and deepening domestic markets. 
Moreover, domestic regulators are unable to influence offshore markets. Therefore policy 
should use prudential regulation
12
 rather than forbid transactions, it order to avoid driving 
markets overseas. 
 
Recent experience suggests the following ranking of policy actions on the exchange rate at 
the current state of capital account convertibility. First, address fundamental weaknesses such 
as large CADs that can trigger adverse expectations, second, use reserves and signalling to 
smooth market demand and supply.  Since capital flows do not always match the net import 
gap, the RBI should be ready to close any short-term demand supply mismatch.  
 
Third, the principle of light touch regulation or minimum collateral damage prioritizes 
prudential measures over tightening controls. Restrictions, if they become necessary, can be 
targeted to a specific market, using degrees of freedom from existing controls. Collecting 
continuous information on one-way positions and if there is evidence of excessive 
speculation, increasing position limits, margin requirements or other regulatory measures are 
preferable to the fourth— a ban on a market or a transaction-type or fifth— to a domestic 
liquidity squeeze or interest rate defence. Position limits and credit curbs can prevent 
domestic parties shorting the rupee by borrowing in domestic markets—but credit curbs, if 
used, should be targeted only to specific commodities such as gold imports. If administrative 
measures reduce one-way positions, a general liquidity squeeze does not contribute much to 
reducing FX positions but it hits other markets (See Box 2).  
                                                          
11
 There are indications offshore markets rise with restrictions on domestic markets. According to BIS (2010, 
2013) net turnover from reporting dealers abroad rose from 5.4 USD bn to 6.1, while that from reporting local 
dealers rose from 11.5 to 12.5 over the three years (Table E10, pp. 74, and Table 11, pp. 58). OTC FX turnover 
outside the country rose from 50 (20.8 USD bn) to 59% (36.3USD bn) of the total (Table E6, pp. 67, and Table 
6.2, pp. 43).  Goyal, Jain and Tiwari (2013) find a bidirectional relationship between the two markets, which 
becomes unidirectional from NDF to onshore when the INR is under downward pressure. 
12
International FX markets survived the GFC relatively well partly since boards imposed limits on capital 
available to traders and they had some liability for losses, thus reducing incentives for risk-taking. 
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Box 2: Policy actions and the structure of interest rates 
The interest rate defence works by raising the return to holding domestic currency over that 
to holding international currencies. If expected depreciation is large, the required rise in 
short-term interest rates can be very high
13
. To effectively impact the cost of domestic 
speculative borrowing the increase in short-term interest rates also has to be large. 
 
 
Figure 8: Indian short and long term interest rates 
 
Figure 8 shows the link between Indian short and long-term rates. The rise in short policy 
rates in the first half of 2008, the sharp cut after the fall of Lehman Brothers, and subsequent 
rise all impacted long-rates.  
 
Figure 9: US and India risk spreads in basis points compared 
 
                                                          
13
 The basic underlying principle is that of uncovered interest parity, which equalizes the expected returns to 
holding assets such as bonds in any currency (see Sarno and Taylor, 2002). Since currencies can easily 
depreciate by 10-40% in a crisis, short-term interest rates have to rise by as much. On 28th January 2014, even 
as the policy repo rate was hiked by 25 basis points there were outflows, mostly debt, due to global risk-off from 
the crash of Argentina’s currency and fears of Chinese credit over-stretch. 
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The difference between interest rates on interbank loans and on risk-free, short-term 
government debt (T-bills) is an indicator of rising counterparty risk, or of tightening liquidity 
in the interbank market. Figure 9 shows the TED spread, the difference between the 3 months 
US T-bill and the 3 months London Euro-Dollar Deposit Rate, and its Indian equivalent, the 
3 months MIBOR (Mumbai Interbank offered rate) minus the 91 days T-bill yield. The US 
TED spread remains generally within the range of 10 and 50 bps (0.1 per cent and 0.5 per 
cent), except in times of financial crisis. A rising TED spread often precedes a downturn in 
the US stock market.  
 
 
Figure 10: Indian 10-year G-sec yields compared to US 
 
In India, however, these spreads are large even in non-crisis times and peak sharply during 
periods when markets are squeezed. That they narrowed during the years of large inflows in 
the mid-2000s suggests that spreads are partly due to tight liquidity or the inability to fine 
tune liquidity in response to shocks in government cash balances and in foreign capital flows. 
If a market is thin, there is such a large impact of a demand or a supply shock.  
 
Curdia and Woodford (2010) argue that, in AEs, a change in spreads has implications for 
optimal monetary policy. A larger, persistent spread in EMs indicates a requirement for 
structural reform, but the changes in the spread due to liquidity shocks have to be reduced or 
compensated for through lower rates, together with vigilant prudential policy to prevent 
bubbles in thin specific markets. Liquidity tightening and use of the interest rate defense also 
have a larger impact in EMs to the extent large spreads raise the average level of lending 
rates. Thus policy should prevent a widening of already large spreads. 
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The interest rate defense raised Indian long rates (Figure 8) and intensified the industrial 
slump. Figure 10 shows that although Indian interest rates were much higher than US this 
could not prevent debt outflows—these were more sensitive to global factors. Raising 
domestic interest rates to keep debt is not useful when international rates are expected to rise, 
and the debt is a small fraction of total foreign investments. The US takes forward interest 
rate guidance seriously after the 1994 mayhem in bond markets following a steep rise in 
policy rates—a lesson the RBI could also internalize. Raising short rates to help foreign 
investors can hurt domestic markets. Stock market volatility had made households averse to 
equity mutual funds. The rise in short-term interest rates hit debt funds. Households exited 
these also, further lowering financial intermediation of savings which is important for 
reducing the CAD.  
…. 
 
6. Exchange rate regime and inflation targeting 
A full float with free capital movements suits the domestic cycle if capital flows out during a 
domestic downturn so the exchange rate depreciates increasing export demand and output; 
and vice versa during an upturn so exchange rate appreciation reduces output thus 
contributing to stabilization. But capital moves due to external shocks that may be totally 
unrelated to domestic conditions. Movements can be unrelated to fundamentals, sentiment 
driven, and excessive. In thin markets, if a central bank does not buy/sell a currency that is 
not freely traded internationally, sharp spikes occur. These raise hedging costs. An exchange 
rate regime must follow a well-sequenced transition path.   
 
In the current stage of capital account convertibility, where interest-sensitive inflows are still 
a small share of total inflows, the exchange rate should not directly enter the policy reaction 
function. The policy rate should respond to the indirect effect of the exchange rate on 
inflation. Alternatives such as intervention, smoothing net demand, and signalling can all be 
used to reverse deviations of the exchange rate from equilibrium, or prevent excessive 
depreciation, thus reducing the pressure to raise interest rates in response to inflation. To the 
extent nominal exchange rate movements reduce inflation, the policy rate can respond less to 
inflation and focus more on deviations from potential output. Even inflation targeting Brazil 
manages the Real to support its inflation target. The interest defense, which requires raising 
the policy rate to appreciate the exchange rate, is likely to be counterproductive.  
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By now there is ample evidence of the impact of the interest rate on domestic aggregate 
demand. The steep rise in policy rates prior to GFC helped cause the crash in industrial 
output just as the steep cut in these rates post GFC led to an unexpectedly fast revival, and the 
cumulative sharp rise by October 2011 contributed to a sustained slowdown. Since the 
interest rate affects output, an exchange rate regime that reduces import-led inflation would 
support a countercyclical interest rate responsive to the domestic cycle. There is some 
freedom to do this since capital mobility is not perfect and the exchange rate is flexible. The 
impossible trinity does not hold. 
 
There are frequent temporary supply shocks, so the exchange rate’s potential to reverse their 
effects on inflation can be acted upon when possible. In general, the exchange rate channel of 
monetary policy transmission has the shortest lag to inflation.  Several policy instruments can 
be used if they are aligned so markets get a clear signal on the policy stance. Because India 
has an inelastic demand for imported intermediates, moderation of shocks to the exchange 
rate can reduce inflation. Flexible inflation forecast targeting will allow the types of exchange 
rate action that reduce inflation, mitigate capital movement induced volatility, and give other 
flexibilities to respond to supply shocks, even while better anchoring inflation expectations. 
For India it is a natural progression that re-orients its present multiple indicator approach 
towards inflation forecasting, thus converting it from an omnibus list to a consideration of the 
determinants of future inflation, even while retaining vital flexibilities. 
 
Some exchange rate flexibility deepens markets and encourages hedging, but excessive 
volatility hurts the real sector— giving another argument for limits to exchange rate 
flexibility. Swings beyond a plus minus five percent invite excessive entry of uninformed 
traders. Markets try to make profits at the expense of the central bank (CB).  Variation of a 
managed float in a band not less than ten per cent, prevents riskless “puts” against the CB, 
since then there is a substantial risk of loss if the expected movement does not materialize. 
Such a band worked in the European exchange rate mechanism. The central value need not be 
announced and can change with inflation differentials in order to prevent real over- or under- 
valuation. Export competitiveness cannot be neglected when the trade deficit is large.  
 
Under large outflows the CB typically comes in after the markets bottoms out so portfolio 
investors share currency risk. The band may, therefore, occasionally be breached but should 
soon revert. Intervention must not be one-sided and has to be strategic.  Timing is very 
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important and must be based on market intelligence covering net open positions, order flow, 
bid-ask spreads (when one-sided positions dominate dealers withdraw from supplying 
liquidity and spreads rise), turnover, and share of interbank trades.  
 
EMs typically have less information and more uncertainty, so signalling can be effective. A 
variety of signals can be used. Different types of research-based estimates of equilibrium 
exchange rates can contribute to focusing market expectations. In addition to the inflation-
differential based REER published currently, a fundamental value of the rupee based on 
factors such as unit labour costs and real wages could be also published. 
 
Since the market is much larger, the RBI can now influence these expectations but cannot act 
totally against them. Overshooting from fundamental currency values and one-way feedback 
trading hurts markets also. Intervention when the market-determined level deviates from 
fundamentals aids market and real stability. These interventions can convey a strong signal, 
even without committing to a specific target exchange rate or deviating from the announced 
position of intervening only to prevent excess current and future volatility in FX markets and 
in the CAD.  
 
7. The way forward 
In the Indian context, flexibility in policy is important, given multiple shocks and constraints. 
Yet this flexibility can be consistent with transparent principles. Managed floating, and 
accumulation and use of reserves against surges in capital flows, can mitigate risks and help 
meet a number of policy objectives. It is not productive to copy AE floats, when the economy 
is not yet an AE. Acting as if the economy behaves in a text book fashion will not make it do 
so. Many Asian countries have developed domestic markets while actively managing their 
currencies.  
 
Although the stated aim was to reduce it, INR volatility was high. More smoothing is 
possible, even without giving a better rate to departing capital and making losses in a falling 
market. The experience since late 2013 showed this. Since small demand-supply mismatches 
lead to large currency movements in thin markets, taking oil marketing companies demand 
out of the market proved extremely helpful.  
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Even so, strong action on the supply-side and resolution of Indian structural issues, are also 
essential for stabilizing the exchange rate and the CAD, and enabling growth supporting 
monetary policy. For a healthy BOP in the long-run, domestic constraints that raise the cost 
of exports and of import substituting manufacture need to be removed, while raising domestic 
oil prices to reduce oil imports. Such reforms must come before any further relaxation for 
short-term debt flows. 
 
AEs deliberately pumped up global asset prices to help their recovery ignoring global 
spillovers from these actions. The stimulus the Fed undertook helped the US make the best 
post-crisis recovery, showing it pays to support the real domestic cycle. AEs are answerable 
largely to their domestic constituencies, but the G-20 and the IMF now have ways to 
pressurize them on external spillovers. It was hoped, after the May 2013 turbulence, the US 
taper on would be more sensitive to EM concerns. It was more carefully designed, with a 
focus on keeping interest rate expectations well-anchored. The reduction of USD 10 bn in 
December did not affect markets. But in January 2014 taper-on reduction occurred despite 
trouble in Argentina and Turkey and enhanced these troubles. There were calls for greater 
global policy coordination, to which the Indian RBI governor rightly contributed. EMs can 
also push for measures that reduce the financial over-leverage that leads to capital flow 
volatility (Goyal 2014). 
 
But the ultimate defence against global volatility is in reducing vulnerability to crises through 
domestic reforms, even as in the short-term a reduced CAD and larger reserves reduce the 
skittishness of capital flows. The low effect on India of the January taper, or the end of US 
QE in October 2014, reflected the success of short-term measures taken, but the continuing 
necessity of longer-term measures should not be forgotten.  
 
References 
BIS (Bank for International Settlements). 2010. Triennial Central Bank Survey, Report on 
global foreign exchange market activity in 2010. Monetary and Economic Department, 
December. 
 
---- 2013. Triennial Central Bank Survey, Report on global foreign exchange market turnover 
in 2013. Monetary and Economic Department, December. 
 
Corden, W.M. 2002. Too Sensational: On the Choice of Exchange Rate Regimes. Cambridge 
MA: MIT Press. 
 
27 
 
Curdia, V. and M. Woodford. 2010. ‘Conventional and unconventional monetary policy,’ 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, July/August, 92 (4): 229-264. 
 
Ghosh, A. and R. S. Rajan. 2007. ‘Exchange rate pass through in Asia: What does the 
literature tell us?’ Asian Pacific Economic Literature. 21 (2): 13-28. 
 
Goyal, A. 2014. ‘Financial regulation and the G20: Options for India’, in The G20 
Macroeconomic Agenda: India and the Emerging Economies. Parthasarthi Shome (ed). 
Cambridge University Press- New Delhi.  
 
---- 2013a. ‘Behind the current account gap’, The Hindu Business Line, April 16. Available at 
http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/ashima-goyal/?pageNo=1 
 
---- 2013b. ‘Balance of payments and imperatives of capital inflows’. In MEDC Economic 
Digest- Challenges of India's balance of payments, 42(8): 16-19, June 
 
---- 2011. ‘Exchange rate regimes and macroeconomic performance in South Asia’, chapter 
10 in Raghbendra Jha (ed.), Routledge Handbook on South Asian Economies, pp. 143-155, 
Oxon and NY: Routledge. 
 
Goyal, R., R. Jain and S. Tewari. 2013. ‘Non deliverable forward and onshore Indian rupee 
market: A study on inter-linkages’. RBI working paper W P S (DEPR): 11 / 2013. Available 
at http://rbidocs.rbi.org.in/rdocs/Publications/PDFs/11WPSN201213.pdf 
 
IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2014. How do changes in the investor base and financial 
deepening affect emerging market economies? Chapter 2 in Global Financial Stability 
Report: Moving from Liquidity- to Growth-Driven Markets. Available at 
http://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/GFSR/2014/01/pdf/c2.pdf. Accessed on April 4, 2014. 
 
---- 2013. Global impact and challenges of unconventional monetary policies. IMF Policy 
Paper. October. 
 
Mallick, S. and H. Marques. 2008. ‘Pass-through of exchange rate and tariffs into import 
process of India: Currency depreciation versus import liberalization’. Review of International 
Economics. 16 (4): 765-782. 
 
RBI (Reserve Bank of India). 2014. Macroeconomic and Monetary Developments: Third 
Quarter Review 2013-14, January. 
 
Sarno, L., and M. P. Taylor. 2002. The Economics of Exchange Rates, UK: Cambridge 
University Press. 
